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Security17 November 20266 min read · 1,268 words

Rootways Authorize.net Magento Flaw Exploited: What to Do

N7

No7 Engineering Team

Growth Architecture Unit

Security: Rootways Authorize.net Magento Flaw Exploited: What to Do (illustration)

Rootways Authorize.net CIM is a paid Magento 2 extension that takes card, Apple Pay and Google Pay payments through Authorize.net. Its Apple Pay endpoint has a flaw that lets anyone, without logging in, make the store's server fetch a web address or file of their choosing and return the result. On 17 November 2026 the security firm Sansec published an advisory saying an attacker used it on 15 November to take over a Magento store and plant a card skimmer. The same day, Rootways released version 4.1.5 with a release note that reads "Security fix: Apple Pay merchant validation now only connects to Apple Pay servers over HTTPS. All earlier versions are affected, please update immediately." If your store runs this extension, update it today. If Apple Pay was switched on, check the store for signs of compromise as well.

What is the Rootways Authorize.net CIM vulnerability?

Apple Pay on the web needs a merchant validation step, in which the store's server asks Apple for a session and passes it to the browser. Sansec says the Rootways controller at /rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index takes that Apple address from a validationUrl request parameter, fetches it with curl without checking the host or the protocol, and returns what it fetched to the visitor. No login is needed.

Sansec classes this as server-side request forgery (CWE-918) with a full read primitive. Curl also handles file://, gopher:// and dict:// addresses. Sansec says that lets an anonymous visitor read any file the PHP user can read, including app/etc/env.php with the database credentials and the Magento encryption key. The same visitor can send raw data to services that only listen on the server itself, such as Redis or a database manager, and query the hosting provider's cloud metadata service. Sansec's advisory does not give a CVE number.

Which versions are affected?

The extension is sold by Rootways as the Composer package rootways/module-authorizecim (module Rootways_Authorizecim). The two sources differ on how far the fix is confirmed, so both are shown:

VersionStatusSource
4.0.0, released on 2 June 2025Confirmed vulnerable; Sansec says earlier versions with Apple Pay support are likely affected tooSansec
4.1.4, released on 29 October 2026Its release note mentions an Apple Pay validation fix; Sansec says it has not verified whether that release fixes this flawSansec, Rootways
4.1.5, released on 17 November 2026Rootways describes it as a security fix and says all earlier versions are affectedRootways release notes

Sansec's advisory, published the same day, says Rootways had not yet confirmed a fixed version. Until Sansec or Rootways says more, install 4.1.5 and also follow the steps below, including the compromise checks if Apple Pay was enabled.

To see which version you run, use composer show rootways/module-authorizecim, or for an installation under app/code, grep '"version"' app/code/Rootways/Authorizecim/composer.json, as Sansec suggests.

How the attack on one store worked

Sansec investigated one breach: a Magento 2.4.8 store on Cloudways running Rootways 4.0.0 with Apple Pay enabled. Sansec says the whole chain took 14 hours:

  1. Reading the configuration. The first file the attacker read through the Apple Pay endpoint was app/etc/env.php, which holds the database password, the encryption key and the admin URL.
  2. Finding a way in. An attempt to write files through the store's Redis server, which had no password, failed. The attacker then read /proc/net/tcp to list listening ports and found Adminer, the database manager Cloudways installs by default, on port 8082.
  3. Creating an admin account. Using the database password and the same endpoint, the attacker logged in to Adminer, added an admin account and ran 887 SQL statements over the next hours.
  4. Running code. Sansec says the attacker made a request fail on purpose, so Magento wrote an error report containing PHP code to var/report/. The attacker then loaded that file through an admin email template preview. A web shell was dropped at pub/media_sync.php and a clean-up script deleted 2,408 error reports and helper files.
  5. Stealing card data. Later that day a skimmer loader appeared in the design/head/includes configuration. It sends card data over a WebSocket to 45-86-62-180.sslip.io.

Sansec says one address in Russia sent 5,501 of the 8,272 requests to the Apple Pay endpoint. Every probe carried a numbered marker, which Sansec reads as an automated or agent-driven operator. The attacker started the evening before, at 22:58 UTC on 14 November, by trying older Magento flaws: PolyShell, SessionReaper, StyleSmuggler and BlockStrap.

Timeline

DateEvent
2 June 2025Rootways releases version 4.0.0 (Sansec)
29 October 2026Rootways releases 4.1.4 with an Apple Pay validation fix (Rootways)
14 November 2026, 22:58 UTCThe attacker starts probing the store with older Magento exploits (Sansec)
15 November 2026The attacker exploits the Apple Pay endpoint and plants a skimmer (Sansec)
16 November 2026Sansec finds the cause, reports it to Rootways and adds blocking rules to its Shield product
17 November 2026Sansec publishes its advisory; Rootways releases 4.1.5 as a security fix (Rootways)

What to do now

  1. Check whether you run the extension. Run the version check above on every environment, including staging.
  2. Update to 4.1.5. Rootways says all earlier versions are affected. Get the update through your Rootways account or Composer, then run the usual bin/magento setup:upgrade and cache flush.
  3. Or switch Apple Pay off until you can update. Sansec tells merchants to set payment/rootways_authorizecim_option_applepay/active to 0 and flush the cache, for example with bin/magento config:set payment/rootways_authorizecim_option_applepay/active 0 followed by bin/magento cache:flush.
  4. Block bad requests at the web server. Sansec recommends rejecting requests to the endpoint when validationUrl is not an https:// address on apple-pay-gateway*.apple.com.
  5. If Apple Pay was enabled, assume compromise. Sansec says to rotate the database password and the crypt/key in env.php, review the admin_user table for accounts you do not recognise, and check core_config_data for changes to design/head/includes.
  6. Close the routes the attacker used. Put a password on Redis and restrict Adminer or any other database tool to trusted IP addresses. On Cloudways, Adminer listens on port 8082 by default.

Indicators of compromise

These come from Sansec's advisory. Finding any of them means the store should be treated as breached:

  • Requests to /rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index with a validationUrl that is not on apple-pay-gateway*.apple.com, or with a parameter containing <?=.
  • Files: pub/media_sync.php, var/report/i08*_*.php, var/report/i086w.php, var/report/cache_report.so, /tmp/i086_x.so, /tmp/i086_cmd.sh and /tmp/i087w.php.
  • Strings in files, the database or logs: msync7a3f91, I086PUB-, X-I086: pub, @media.sync, G-HE9K4M2P8R and __hybridWs.
  • Network: 45-86-62-180.sslip.io, 45.86.62.180, 37.72.140.221, 45.166.20.61, 54.39.16.34 and 2.27.168.28.

If you find any of these, keep a copy of the evidence before cleaning up, and remember that card data may have been taken, which brings in your payment provider and card scheme obligations.

Does this affect Shopify or BigCommerce stores?

No. The flaw is in a Magento 2 extension, which Shopify and BigCommerce stores do not run. It only affects Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce stores with the Rootways Authorize.net CIM extension installed. Shopify stores had their own October incident, the checkout hijack through hacked app settings.

What to do next

Update the extension or switch Apple Pay off today, then run the compromise checks. Make sure the store also has the July 2026 Adobe update covered in our PolyShell post, since this attacker tried that flaw first. If keeping Magento and its extensions patched has become the main cost of running the store, our guides to Magento upgrade cost versus replatforming and Magento alternatives set out the options, and our Magento to Shopify migration team can plan the move.

Frequently Asked Questions

The questions buyers and engineers ask us most about this topic.

What is the Rootways Authorize.net CIM vulnerability?

It is a server-side request forgery flaw in the Apple Pay endpoint of the Rootways Authorize.net CIM payment extension for Magento 2. Sansec says the controller at /rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index fetches whatever address is passed in its validationUrl parameter, without checking the host or protocol and without a login, and returns the result. That lets an attacker read server files such as app/etc/env.php and reach services that only listen on the server itself.

Is the Rootways Authorize.net CIM flaw being exploited?

Yes. Sansec says an attacker exploited it on 15 November 2026 against a Magento 2.4.8 store running version 4.0.0 with Apple Pay enabled. The attacker read the database password and encryption key, created an admin account, ran code and injected a card skimmer that sends data to 45-86-62-180.sslip.io.

Which Rootways Authorize.net CIM version fixes the Apple Pay flaw?

Rootways released version 4.1.5 on 17 November 2026 with the note that Apple Pay merchant validation now only connects to Apple Pay servers over HTTPS, and says all earlier versions are affected. Sansec's advisory from the same day says Rootways had not confirmed a fix and that it had not verified whether 4.1.4 fixes the flaw.

How do I check which Rootways Authorize.net CIM version my store runs?

Run composer show rootways/module-authorizecim, or for an installation under app/code, read the version field in app/code/Rootways/Authorizecim/composer.json. Check every environment, including staging.

How do I disable Apple Pay in the Rootways extension?

Sansec says to set payment/rootways_authorizecim_option_applepay/active to 0 and flush the cache, for example with bin/magento config:set payment/rootways_authorizecim_option_applepay/active 0 and then bin/magento cache:flush. Keep it off until the store runs a fixed version.

What should I do if Apple Pay was enabled on my Magento store?

Sansec says to assume compromise: rotate the database password and the crypt/key in env.php, review the admin_user table for unknown accounts, check core_config_data for changes to design/head/includes, and search for its indicators of compromise, such as pub/media_sync.php and connections to 45-86-62-180.sslip.io.

Does the Rootways flaw affect Shopify stores?

No. It is in a Magento 2 extension, so it only affects Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce stores that have the Rootways Authorize.net CIM extension installed. Shopify and BigCommerce stores do not run it.